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THE MERCHANT OF ARTICLE 2
DOUGLAS K. NEWELL*
Statutory definitions give the reader a sense of confidence by
supplying apparently precise meaning. In addition to establishing
meaning a draftsman may, by defining a term, provide a basis for
clear, brief and consistent usage and a tag for reference in later parts
of the statute. But as one author has pointed out,
[t]he rewards are so alluring that it is easy to overlook the
prime difficulty-the process of defining-and the attend-
ant burden of remembering to follow [one's] own defini-
tions. The UCC has opted for the rewards and blinked at
the difficulties.'
Nowhere are the difficulties of definition more apparent than
in subsections (1) and (3) of 2-104 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
wherein the definitions of "merchant ' 2 and "between merchants '3
are found. The language in these definitions has been variously
described as ambiguous,4 awkward,' odd,' difficult to construe7 and
leading to conclusions which do not make much sense. 8
* Assistant Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark College, Northwestern School of Law. The
author wishes to thank Thomas A. Gordon, a second-year student, for his research assistance
in the preparation of this article.
1. Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 185, 186
(1967).
2. The Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter cited as UCC] § 2-104(1) (1972 Official
Text) provides:
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices
or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be
attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by
his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Code are to the 1972 Official Text.
3. UCC § 2-104(3) provides: "'Between merchants' means in any transaction with
respect to which both parties are chargeable with the knowledge or skill of merchants."
4. Professor Kripke's remarks in Hearing Before Enlarged Editorial Board, January 27-
29, 1951, 6 Bus. LAW. 164, 183 (1951).
5. Lattin, The Law of Sales in the Uniform Commercial Code, 15 OHIo ST. L.J. 12, 21
(1954).
6. Waite, The Proposed New Uniform Sales Act, 48 MICH. L. REv. 603, 618 (1950)
(referring to an earlier version of 2-104 which contained quite similar language).
7. Note, Merchant Provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code-Sales, 39 GEO. L.J.
130, 131 (1951) (referring to an earlier version of 2-104 which contained quite similar lan-
guage).
8. BENDER'S U.C.C. SERVICE, DUESENBERG & KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS § 1.02
(1966) [hereinafter cited as BENDER].
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The purpose9 of this article is to examine the merchant defini-
tions. At a minimum it is hoped that much of the case law and
commentary concerning the merchant of Article 2 can be compiled
in one place so that those who face a merchant question in the future
will have a useful starting point. More ambitiously, an attempt will
be made to clarify this murky area of the law. Various interpreta-
tions of the merchant sections will be suggested and discussed. The
author's thesis is that the merchant definition in 2-104(1) is more
complex than necessary and that a resort to common sense and the
nature and purpose of the special rules for merchants will lead to a
greater understanding of the merchant concept.
Four parts comprise the body of this article. In Part I, some of
the causes of the definitional difficulties are explored in order to
provide a perspective for the remainder. In Part II, the merchant
definitions contained in 2-104(1) and the variations in other Code
sections'0 are divided into 13 possible variations of the definition of
merchant. In Part III, the significance of the differences among the
13 possible variations is discussed. In Part IV, methods of interpret-
ing the sections which establish special rules for merchants (as op-
posed to the general rules for both merchants and non-merchants)
are examined.
I. CAUSES OF DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS
One can never be certain why the talented people who drafted
the merchant definitions were unable to arrive at a clearer state-
ment. However, among the more significant reasons would appear
to be (1) a lack of basic agreement, (2) a conflict of drafting philoso-
phies and (3) the choice of "merchant" as the word to describe the
category.
Lack of Basic Agreement
The individuals who drafted, reviewed and adopted the Code
seem to have been unable to agree on which persons ought to be
included in the merchant category. Discussing the historical basis
and the need for distinguishing merchants from other persons, the
late Karl Llewellyn stated:
An early Nineteenth Century period in which the idea
9. This, of course, assumes there must be some purpose other than lifting the author
from total obscurity to relative anonymity on a professional rating scale.
10. I.e., 2-312(3), 2-314(1) and 2-403(2).
(Vol. 7
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of the merchant's obligations threatened to be lost was fol-
lowed by the recapture and re-establishment of the idea.
The whole law, developed now over more than a hundred
years, on foreign trade terms and letters of credit-and the
whole current effort to establish by bankers' and mer-
chants' negotiation "uniform" interpretations and clauses
and "customs"-and the whole current successful move-
ment to build, association-wise, "standard terms"-all of
these rest on a vital need for distinguishing merchants from
housewives and from farmers and from mere lawyers."
Yet, a comment to 2-104 (defining merchant), in referring to 2-
201(2), 2-205, 2-207 and 2-209, states:
For purposes of these sections almost every person in busi-
ness would, therefore, be deemed to be a "merchant" under
the language "who. . . by his occupation holds himself out
as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices...
involved in the transaction . . ." since the practices in-
volved in the transaction are non-specialized business prac-
tices such as answering mail. In this type of provision,
banks or even universities, for example, well may be "mer-
chants." But even these sections only apply to a merchant
in his mercantile capacity; a lawyer or bank president buy-
ing fishing tackle for his own use is not a merchant.'
The negative implication of the last quoted sentence is that a
lawyer in his "mercantile capacity" is a merchant under Article 2.
The implication of the earlier quoted language of 2-104(1) is that a
farmer could also be a merchant. If this is the case, Llewellyn's
quoted statement" before a body considering adoption of the Code
is more than a little perplexing.
Similar difficulties arise from the statement in the same com-
ment that "[t]he term 'merchant' as defined here roots in the 'law
merchant' concept of a professional in business."" It is questionable
whether a busy lawyer would have the time or inclination to chase
down this reference; if he does, he will discover that the law mer-
11. 1 NEw YORK REPORT OF THE LAW REv. COMM'N FOR 1954 AND RECORD OF HEARINGS
ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 107-08 (1954) (emphasis added).
12. UCC § 2-104, Comment 2.
13. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
14. UCC § 2-104, Comment 2.
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chant dealt primarily with traders and peddlers and thus concerned
a much smaller class of persons than is apparently intended by the
Code.'5
Like problems of definition seem to have occurred at meetings
of the Editorial Board and at subsequent meetings concerning the
adoption of the Code. The following statement was made by Profes-
sor Kripke at the January 28, 1951 meeting of the Editorial Board.
In correspondence I had last week with Miss Mentschi-
koff and continued yesterday by notes back and forth across
the table, I think we isolated, at least to my satisfaction,
an ambiguity in the concept of merchant which I think
ought to be called to the attention of the Editorial Board,
the term "merchant" being someone that has knowledge or
skill peculiar to ihe practices or the goods involved in the
transaction.
Now, the word "practices" leads to one thing. The
word "goods" leads to another, and that is the ambiguity I
wanted to point out.
If you throw the emphasis on "goods" a merchant is a
person who deals with a particular kind of thing. A grocer
is a merchant as to groceries and not as to steel. If you throw
the emphasis on practices you reach the conclusion that a
commercial lawyer is a merchant with respect to all kinds
of sales, or that a professional purchasing agent in a corpo-
ration is a merchant as to all kinds of goods, whether or not
he has ever dealt with the particular kind of goods involved.
Miss Mentschikoff makes it clear to me that that is in
fact her intention.
Now we have two types of rules applicable to mer-
chants in this Article. One is the type which assumes that
the man deals in a particular kind of goods involved and
therefore can be given an additional responsibility with re-
spect to that kind of goods. If he is a merchant and he
rejects the goods as noncomplying with the contract, he
has to go out and sell them for the seller because by as-
sumption he has facilities in that line of business.
15. F. WHITNEY, THE LAW OF MODERN COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 111 (1958).
[Vol. 7
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If you switched, however, to the other concept of mer-
chant, he may be merely a commercial lawyer or a purchas-
ing agent. He may have no facility with respect to the par-
ticular kind of goods involved.
The other set of provisions applicable to merchants
here are those provisions which merely assume that the
man has ordinary business competence and experience and
owes an obligation to act with ordinary business prud-
ence-specifically, to answer his mail. Thus a merchant is
under a duty to reply to a memo by the other party stating
his understanding of the deal. A merchant is under a duty
to give his reason for rejection of the goods.
Those types of provisions have nothing to do with the
question whether the man is an expert with respect to the
particular goods. They have merely to do with the question
whether he has business experience, and as I have said
before, can be expected to answer his mail.
The effect of the ambiguity in the definition, I think,
is to make those provisions which assume a knowledge of
the goods too broad; and on the other hand, those which
merely assume ordinary business knowledge are either too
narrow or inadequate, depending on how you read the defi-
nition.
In my opinion, the definition cannot properly be read
or has no meaning if you take it merely to mean general
business knowledge. But unless you take it that way, these
provisions which assume merely ordinary business knowl-
edge are too narrow.
Therefore, I should like to suggest that as to that sec-
ond group we spell out the concept of merchant, and, if you
don't want the provision to be generally applicable, make
it applicable to everyone but, say, a consumer purchaser.
In other words, everyone but the consumer who by assump-
tion of the draftsman of this Code won't have any business
experience, is bound to exercise the ordinary business cour-
tesy of answering his mail, and then confine the concept of
merchant only to people who are experts with respect to the
particular kind of goods involved."
16. Professor Kripke's remarks, supra note 4, at 183.
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The ambiguity of definition referred to by Professor Kripke was
carried forward to a joint meeting of the sponsor organizations,
where the definition was approved in a manner which indicates that
not everyone had a full understanding of who was to be included in
the merchant category. As Professor Kripke reports:
I then opposed the definition on the floor at the joint meet-
ing of the sponsor organizations, on the ground that the
application of this artificial definition to lawyers, purchas-
ing agents of institutions, and others would unfairly take
such persons by surprise. Another speaker said that he
would support my opposition if the definition had this sur-
prise element, but that the definition could not possibly
mean what I suggested as to lawyers. No member of the
drafting staff corrected his misapprehension, and the defi-
nition was therefore approved by the joint meeting. 7
Cries that the definitions of merchant did not clearly specify
who is a merchant were heard frequently during the preparation of
the Code.'" Nonetheless, the definition was not modified to any
significant extent. The major reason for the lack of modification
appears to have been the feeling of many that most of the merchant
rules were "intended to apply to non-merchants except when there
is some element of harshness or unfair surprise."' 9
Conflict of Drafting Philosophies
The problem of a definition that means different things to dif-
ferent people is compounded by and is partially the result of a
conflict in drafting philosophies. On the one hand the drafters opted
for the technique of centrally defining those persons who should be
subject to special rules, and thus created a term to be used through-
out Article 2 whenever the drafters wished to refer to such persons.20
The justification for this technique has been stated as follows:
Drafting techniques of this kind, consistently followed
17. Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code,
1962 U. ILL. L.F. 321, 325-26.
18. See, e.g., Waite, The Proposed New Uniform Sales Act, 48 MICH. L. REv. 603, 617-
19 (1950); Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HAuv.
L. REV. 561, 572-73 (1950); Report of the Committee on the Proposed Commercial Code, 6
Bus. LAW. 119, 126 (1951).
19. Report on Article 2-Sales By Certain Members of Faculty of Harvard Law School,
6 Bus. LAW. 151, 154 (1951).
20. See UCC § 2-104, Comment 1.
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through the Code, can be of great value in achieving the
precision and consistency of language desired in any stat-
ute. Of course, the use of specifically defined terms also
avoids much repetition in language.2'
On the other hand, the drafters have:
(1) Included various definitions within 2-104 (definition of
merchant) and used other definitions in certain of the sections
which establish special rules for merchants;22
(2) Suggested in the comments that reference must be made
to the nature of each section which deals with merchants to deter-
mine which of the different definitions is applicable; 3 and
(3) Indicated that a general drafting concept of the Code is
"that proper construction follows the reason and is limited or ex-
tended by it; ' '24 consequently, the courts should be free to broaden
a definition or apply a rule to persons not directly covered if the
reason of the rule so dictates. 5
If "merchant" (whomever it may designate) means the same
persons in 2-201(2) (Statute of Frauds between merchants) as it
does in 2-603 (duties of merchant as to goods rejected rightfully), the
drafters have created a useful legal shorthand. If it means different
persons in different sections, then the drafters might have been
better off to leave the matter to be determined in each section.26
Consistency of meaning is extremely important to sound legislative
drafting; 7 without consistency, the Code may "cause confusion in-
stead of clarification and perhaps make the Code the despair of busy
lawyers."28
The Choice of the Word "Merchant"
Even had there been complete agreement on which persons
were merchants and consistent application of the term, there would
21. Report of the Committee on the Proposed Commercial Code, 6 Bus. LAw. 119, 125
(1951).
22. See notes 44-51 infra and accompanying text.
23. UCC § 2-104, Comment 2.
24. S. MENTSCHIKOFF, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS 6 (1970) (em-
phasis added).
25. Id.
26. Williston, supra note 18, at 572-73.
27. See STAFF OF OREGON LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL COMM., BILL DRAFTING MANUAL 21 (1968).
28. Report, supra note 21, at 143-44.
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still have been problems because of the selection of the word "mer-
chant" to designate the category. In discussing the subject of statu-
tory interpretation, the late Justice Frankfurter noted:
Words of art bring their art with them. They bear the
meaning of their habitat whether it be a phrase of technical
significance in the scientific or business world, or whether
it be loaded with the recondite connotations of feudalism.
Holmes made short shrift of a contention by remarking that
statutes used "familiar legal expressions in their familiar
legal sense." The peculiar idiom of business or of adminis-
trative practice often modifies the meaning that ordinary
speech assigns to language. And if a word is obviously
transplanted from another legal source, whether the com-
mon law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with it.2"
There is much "old soil" attached to the word "merchant." Clearly,
the drafters meant to define "merchant" in some unique ways and
expected courts and lawyers to acquiesce. Most people would cer-
tainly agree that interpretation of a statutory term should begin
with the statutory definition; 3° however, it should have been ex-
pected that old definitions of a common term would be resurrected,
particularly when the comments often refer to other meanings.3 '
The problem is exemplified by the best known case which inter-
preted the merchant definition: Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis. 32 In that
case, the Arkansas Supreme Court had the task of determining
whether the defendant Fallis was a merchant. The determination
was crucial to the parties, for if Fallis were deemed a merchant his
Code Statute of Frauds3 defense to an alleged oral contract for the
sale and delivery of soybeans would have been lost.34 Fallis, a farmer
29. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527,
537 (1947) (footnote omitted).
30. See id. at 535-36.
31. See, e.g., UCC § 2-104, Comment 2.
32. 239 Ark. 962, 395 S.W.2d 555 (1965).
33. UCC § 2-201(1).
34. UCC § 2-201(2) provides:
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the
contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has
reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against
such party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within ten days
after it is received.
The court apparently misconceived the effect of finding Fallis to be a merchant, stating
"if appellee is a merchant he would be liable on the alleged contract because he did not,
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 3 [1973], Art. 2
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who regularly grew soybeans on 325 acres of his 550 acre farm,
seemed to fit the merchant definition as a "dealer of goods of the
kind," 5 or one who "by his occupation holds himself out as having
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the
transaction . . . ."I Nonetheless, the court ignored the Code's mer-
chant definition in 2-104(1) and relied instead on the maxim, "In
construing a statute its words must be given their plain and ordi-
nary meaning. '3 By referring to Words and Phrases,3" the court
found various pre-Code cases to support its holding that Fallis was
not a merchant.39
The above case may, if one wishes, be dismissed as an aberra-
tion. However, when a common everyday merchant, 0 a merchant
subject to the law merchant,4' and a merchant as defined in pre-
Code law 2 are different from each other and from the merchant
defined in the Code,4" the seeds of confusion are present.
II. THIRTEEN PosSmLE DEFINITIONS
Putting aside the non-Code definition of merchant suggested
above,44 one is still faced with a large number of possibly different
definitions of merchant under various sections of the Code. As a
starting point, it should be noted that the basic definition in 2-
104(1) refers to "a person"; resort to the Code definitions shows that
"person" includes a variety of entities. First, the Code defines "per-
son" to include an "individual" or an "organization." '45 Pushing
forward through the definitions, one is told that
"[o]rganization" includes a corporation, government or
within ten days, give written notice that he rejected it." 239 Ark. at 963, 395 S.W.2d at 556.
35. UCC § 2-104(1).
36. Id.; see also Comment, A Farmer Is Not a "Merchant" Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code-Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 345 (1966); cf. Azevedo v. Minister,
86 Nev. 576, 471 P.2d 661 (1970) (hay ranchers conceded that they were "merchants").
37. 239 Ark. at 964, 395 S.W.2d at 557.
38. Id. at 963-64, 395 S.W.2d at 556-57.
39. Id.
40. P. ROGET, ROGET'S INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS 828.2 (3d ed. 1962) defines "mer-
chant" as, e.g., "shopkeeper," "storekeeper" and "businessman."
41. F. WHITNEY, supra note 15, § 111.
42. For example, in 27 WORDS AND PHRASES, Merchant (1961), every case but one listed
under the "Manufacturer" subheading distinguished a merchant from a manufacturer. Id.
at 139-41. The cases listed under the "Farmer" subheading distinguished a merchant from a
farmer. Id. at 136.
43. See UCC § 2-104(1).
44. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
45. UCC § 1-201(30).
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governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate,
trust, partnership or association, two or more persons hav-
ing a joint or common interest, or any other legal or com-
mercial entity.46
Thus, for purposes of analysis, it is sufficient to recognize that any
conceivable individual or entity may be a merchant if he or it satis-
fies the other requirements of the definition.
Excluding the variations provided by the definition of person,
2-104 suggests nine theoretically variant definitions of merchant:
(1) A person who deals in goods of the kind;
(2) A person who by his occupation holds himself out as hav-
ing knowledge peculiar to the practices involved in the transaction;
(3) A person who by his occupation holds himself out as hav-
ing knowledge peculiar to the goods involved in the transaction;
(4) A person who by his occupation holds himself out as hav-
ing skill peculiar to the practices involved in the transaction;
(5) A person who by his occupation holds himself out as hav-
ing skill peculiar to the goods involved in the transaction;
(6) A person to whom knowledge peculiar to the practices
involved in the transaction may be imputed by his employment of
an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation
holds himself out as having such knowledge;
(7) A person to whom knowledge peculiar to the goods
involved in the transaction may be imputed by his employment of
an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation
holds himself out as having such knowledge;
(8) A person to whom skill peculiar to the practices involved
in the transaction may be imputed by his employment of an agent
or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself
out as having such skill;
(9) A person to whom skill peculiar to the goods involved in
the transaction may be imputed by his employment of an agent or
broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself
out as having such skill.
The above nine variations of the definition of merchant are
46. Id. § 1-201(28).
[Vol. 7
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based upon distinctions between "skill" and "knowledge," between
"goods" and "practices," and among three concepts which one com-
mentator described as follows:
(a) Dealer. He may be a person who deals in goods of
a kind involved. Whether he deals in other goods is imma-
terial. He must deal in goods of the kind involved in the
transaction in order to come within this first category.
(b) Representation. He may be a person who by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transac-
tion. Whether he actually has such knowledge or skill is
immaterial if he so holds himself out.
(c) Principal. He may be a person who employs an
agent, broker, or other intermediary who by his occupation
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to
the practices or goods involved in the transaction."
In addition to the basic 2-104(1) definitions of merchant, four
other varieties of merchants are suggested in other sections of Arti-
cle 2:
(10) A party who is "chargeable with the knowledge or skill" of
a merchant;48
(11) One who is "a merchant regularly dealing in goods of the
kind ... ,
(12) One who is "a merchant with respect to goods of that kind
"'50
(13) One who is "a merchant who deals in goods of that kind
''51
HI. ANALYZING THE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE MERCHANT DEFINITIONS
The express goal of the drafters in establishing different or spe-
cial rules for merchants was to distinguish between "professionals
in a given field" and "a casual or inexperienced seller or buyer."5
47. 1 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-104:4, at 220 (2d ed. 1970).
48. UCC § 2-104(3).
49. Id. § 2-312(3).
50. Id. § 2-314(1).
51. Id. § 2-403(2).
52. Id. § 2-104, Comment 1.
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For such a seemingly simple task they nonetheless created the varia-
tions of merchant identified in Part II. In this part, an attempt will
be made to analyze the differences among the variations. Differ-
ences in definitions resulting from the drafters' use of redundant
phrases, undefined terms, and slight word variations among Code
sections will be examined, and the phrase "mercantile capacity"
(referred to in a comment 3 as limiting the scope of the merchant
class) will be discussed.
Variations in Definition
1. "Goods of the Kind"
If a merchant is a dealer in goods of the kind under 2-104(1),
does one entrust possession of goods under 2-403(2) (entrusting to a
merchant)54 to a dealer in goods of the kind who deals in goods of
that kind? Does a "merchant regularly dealing in goods of the
kind'' 5 deal with goods more frequently or systematically than "a
merchant who deals in goods of that kind"" or "a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind"? 7 Is "a merchant with respect to
goods of that kind"" ever someone other than a dealer? These ques-
tions must be asked when one attempts to ascertain whether there
are any significant differences among variations 1, 11, 12 and 13 set
out in Part II of this article.
The redundancy created by defining a merchant as "a dealer
in goods of the kind' 59 and then, in three other sections, designating
a merchant as one "regularly dealing in goods of the kind,""° "with
respect to goods of that kind,"'" or "who deals in goods of that
kind"62 apparently resulted from a failure of the drafters to coordi-
nate the drafting of 2-104(1) with that of Sections 2-312(3) (war-
ranty against infringement), 2-314(1) (warranty of merchantability)
53. Id. § 2-104, Comment 2.
54. UCC § 2-403(2) provides:
Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that
kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in the ordinary
course of business.
55. UCC § 2-312(3) (emphasis added).
56. Id. § 2-403(2).
57. Id. § 2-314(1).
58. Id.
59. Id. § 2-104(1).
60. Id. § 2-312(3).
61. Id. § 2-314(1).
62. Id. § 2-403(2).
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and 2-403(2) (entrusting to a merchant). The references to "goods
of the kind" in 2-312(3), 2-314(1) and 2-403(2) designate these as
sections which are concerned with a merchant who must be asso-
ciated with the goods involved in the transaction as opposed to a
merchant who is only familiar with business practices. The Code
definitions would have been much easier to follow if similar refer-
ences to goods had been made in all sections which are goods ori-
ented63 and the "dealer" phraseology had been deleted from 2-104.
The apparent variations in definition among Sections 2-312(3),
2-314(1) and 2-403 should be examined by looking at the respective
sections. Section 2-312(3), which deals with the warranty against
infringement, provides:
Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a merchant regularly
dealing in goods of the kind warrants that the goods shall
be delivered free of the rightful claim of any third person
by way of infringement or the like but a buyer who fur-
nishes specifications to the seller must hold the seller harm-
less against any such claim which arises out of compliance
with the specifications.
As noted above, there is a question whether use of the word
"regularly" means that a dealer who warrants against "infringe-
ment or the like" is different from other dealers.
Although the comments to this section suggest that perhaps
only retailers are bound by such warranty, 4 most authorities have
concluded that manufacturers and wholesalers should also be in-
cluded.65 Thus the most difficult problem of interpretation is
whether a manufacturer who manufactures a piece of equipment
only once or twice "regularly" deals in goods of the kind.
One author suggests that a lawyer or judge deciding the issue
of whether an infrequent seller warrants against infringement
should first ask whether it is "reasonable to presume that the seller
by reason of the extent of his dealing in the goods has superior
knowledge of the patents relating to the goods," 66 and second,
whether the imposition of this risk on the seller would comport with
63. E.g., 2-402(2), 2-509(3) and 2-603.
64. See UCC § 2-312, Comment 3.
65. BENDER § 5.04, at 5-18, 5-19.
66. Dudine, Warranties Against Infringement Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 36
N.Y. ST. B.J. 214, 218 (1964).
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the Code policy of preserving flexibility in commercial transactions
and encouraging continued expansion of commercial practices.67
What the answer to this two-pronged test would reveal is not stated
by the author. From the tenor of his article, though, it appears that
he would find that such a manufacturer is not "a merchant regularly
dealing in goods of the kind" under this section. The contrary view,
however, has been asserted by other authorities:
Logically, the definition should apply where the seller
is in the business of manufacture and he manufactures
goods of the type generally, and not necessarily goods of the
type specifically. The whole idea behind the warranty
seems to be that the seller is in a better position to conduct
the necessary searches and would have a superior fund or
source of knowledge than would the buyer. This policy
would be consistent in situations where the seller is a manu-
facturer but manufactures this one piece of equipment to
do one particular job that this buyer needs, and where the
seller may not have occasion to go through the process in
the future."
However, it was conceded that such result might come more from
the policy of the section than from the language of the Code or
comments." While there are cases interpreting 2-314(1) (implied
warranty of merchantability) which hold that a person dealing in
goods of the general rather than the specific type is a merchant, 0
the only case interpretation of 2-312(3) concerned an insurance com-
pany which sold a stolen car.7 Putting aside the probable misappli-
cation of the section,7" it is clear that insurance companies are not
car dealers.
The next section pertaining to goods to be considered is 2-
67. Id.
68. BENDER § 5.04, at 5-20.
69. Id. at 5-20, 5-21.
70. Mutual Services of Highland Park, Inc. v. S.O.S. Plumbing and Sewerage Co., 93
Ill. App. 2d 257, 235 N.E.2d 265 (1968) (building supplies dealer selling a new type of hammer
and bit); Regan Purchase & Sales Corp. v. Primavera, 68 Misc. 2d 858, 328 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Civ.
Ct. 1972) (auctioneer).
71. John St. Auto Wrecking v. Motors Ins. Corp., 56 Misc. 2d 232, 288 N.Y.S.2d 281
(Dist. Ct. 1968).
72. The warranty under 2-312(3) seems designed to reach infringements of patents,
trademarks, copyrights and similar proprietary rights. See Dudine, supra note 66, at 220.
[Vol. 7
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314(1), which deals with the implied warranty of merchantability.
It provides in part:
Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty
that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a con-
tract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect
to goods of that kind.
The major question posed by the language of this section is
whether the omission of the words "deals," "dealing" or "dealer"
means that some persons other than dealers could be included. Each
of the other sections73 referring to goods of the kind concerns dealers,
and the predecessor of 2-314(1) in the Uniform Sales Act referred
to a "seller who deals in goods."74 The easy answer is that the omis-
sion makes no difference; at least one commentator has so inti-
mated, although he failed to specify the reason for his belief.75 Oth-
ers appear to have reached a contrary result, suggesting that a wash-
woman selling her washing machine76 or a gun collector selling one
of his guns77 might be deemed to warrant the merchantability of the
goods sold.
A conclusion that the omission of the "dealing" language has
no significance can be supported on several grounds:78
(1) A comment refers to "a merchant in a given line of trade
"79
(2) One of the principal drafters opens the warranties section
73. Sections 2-104(1), 2-312(3) and 2-403(2).
74. UNIFORM SALEs Acr § 15(2).
75. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 46, § 2-312:23, at 475 n.12.
76. Waite, supra note 6, at 618 n.20.
77. Note, supra note 7, at 131.
78. The author is aware that this view is not shared by some eminent authorities. See,
e.g., J. WHIrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 289 (1972). Much of the apparent
disagreement may be a matter of form rather than substance. It is my belief that if the sale
or service problem concerning the scope of Article 2 is resolved in favor of treating the
installation of plumbing, for example, as a sale of goods, then a plumber would be a dealer
in the plumbing supplies which he installs as well as being a person who holds himself out as
familiar with the goods. If this installation of supplies is the situation that Professors White
and Summers are intending to cover when they assert that a plumber is a merchant under
the "holds himself out" language rather than the "deals in goods of the kind" language, then
our difference is one of terminology. If they mean, however, that a plumber gives an implied
warranty of merchantability if he sells an old sink or one of his tools in an isolated transaction,
then we simply disagree on the proper interpretation of 2-314(1).
79. UCC § 2-314, Comment 2.
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of her casebook with an excerpt from a classic work ° which discusses
the Uniform Sales Act warranty of merchantability and the dealers
that gave such warranty.81 No questions are asked or comments
made in the book's warranties section concerning the absence of any
reference to dealers in 2-314(1);
(3) The cases that have interpreted 2-314(1) have all involved
dealers (i.e., manufacturers, 2 wholesalers" and retailers 4), with the
difficult cases discussing whether the person dealt in goods gener-
ally or in goods of the particular kind, 5 or whether a sale of goods
has been made.88
80. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. Rav. 117
(1943).
81. S. MENTSCHIKOFF, supra note 24, at 114.
82. Greenspun v. American Adhesives, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (adhe-
sives); Burks Motors v. International Harvester Co., 250 Ark. 29, 466 S.W.2d 907 (1971)
(truck); International Harvester Co. v. Pike, 249 Ark. 1026, 466 S.W.2d 901 (1971) (truck);
Regina Grape Products Co. v. Supreme Wine Co., 357 Mass. 631, 260 N.E.2d 219 (1970)
(wine).
83. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. L.D. Schreiber Cheese Co., 326 F. Supp. 504 (W.D. Mo.
1971), rev'd on other grounds, 457 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1972) (cheese); International Harvester
Co. v. Pike, 249 Ark. 1026, 466 S.W.2d 901 (1971) (truck).
84. Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968)
(conveyor system); Marion Power Shovel Co. v. Huntsman, 246 Ark. 152, 437 S.W.2d 784
(1969) (machine parts); Georgia Timberlands, Inc. v. Southern Airway Co., 125 Ga. App. 404,
188 S.E.2d 108 (1972) (used airplanes); Mutual Services of Highland Park, Inc. v. S.O.S.
Plumbing & Sewerage Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 257, 235 N.E.2d 265 (1968) (building supplies);
Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass'n, - Ind. App. -, 286 N.E.2d
188 (1972) (chickens); Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Utley, 439 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969)
(farm equipment); Hunt v. Perkins Machinery Co., 352 Mass. 535, 226 N.E.2d 228 (1967)
(diesel engines); Ambassador Steel Co. v. Ewald Steel Co., 33 Mich. App. 495, 190 N.W.2d
275 (1971) (steel); Regan Purchase & Sales Corp. v. Primavera, 68 Misc. 2d 858, 328 N.Y.S.2d
490 (Civ. Ct. 1972) (auctioneer); Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 280 N.C. 385, 186 S.E.2d
161 (1972) (mobile homes); S.F.C. Acceptance Corp. v. Ferree, 39 Pa. D. & C.2d 225, 3 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 808 (C.P. Pa. 1966) (vending machines); Allen v. Savage Arms Corp., 52 Luzerne
Leg. Reg. Rep. 159, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 975 (C.P. Pa. 1962) (hardware).
85. Prince v. Levan, 486 P.2d 959 (Sup. Ct. Alas. 1971) (fishermen sold their boat);
Mutual Services of Highland Park, Inc. v. S.O.S. Plumbing & Sewerage Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d
257, 235 N.E.2d 265 (1968) (dealer in building supplies sold a new type of hammer and bit);
Regan Purchase & Sales Corp. v. Primavera, 68 Misc. 2d 858, 328 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Civ. Ct.
1972) (auctioneer sold restaurant equipment).
86. Gable v. Silver,__ Fla. Supp. ,10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 316 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
(builder of condominiums); Wentzel v. Berliner, - Fla. Supp. -, 204 So. 2d 905 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1967) (caterer acted as church volunteer); Schuchman v. John Hopkins Hosp., 9
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 637 (Md. Super. Ct. 1971) (hospital); Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp. of
Queens, 60 Misc. 2d 733, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (hospital administered contami-
nated blood); Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp. of Philadelphia, - Pa. D. & C.2d - , 6
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 779 (C.P. Pa. 1969), vacated & remanded, 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970)
(hospital administered contaminated blood).
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Dealers give a warranty of merchantability because they are
expected to stand behind the goods; the warranty thus does not
depend on actual knowledge or reason to know of possible defects.
Consequently, retail dealers consistently have been held liable when
selling goods in containers which have been sealed by the manufac-
turer."
A dealer in the general type of goods who has never sold the
specific type of article before should be held to warrant merchanta-
bility under the spirit of 2-314(1). Two cases so indicate. In Mutual
Services of Highland Park, Inc. v. S.O.S. Plumbing & Sewerage
Co.,"' a retail building supply dealer was held to warrant the mer-
chantability of a drilling hammer and bit; the dealer sold a general
line of merchandise from the same manufacturer but did not ordi-
narily sell this particular type of hammer and bit. Regan Purchase
& Sales Corp. v. Primavera"9 suggested that an auctioneer who sold
different kinds of goods on an ongoing basis would be held to war-
rant the merchantability of a particular item where the circumstan-
ces implied the likelihood of repeated sales of similar goods. The
comments, however, suggest that an isolated sale of goods is not
enough.'"
The most heavily cited merchant section in case law is probably
2-403(2) (entrusting to a merchant), which provides:
Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant
who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer
all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of
business.
Most of the cases interpreting this section involve retailers9' and
87. Prosser, supra note 80, at 150.
88. 93 Ill. App. 2d 257, 235 N.E.2d 265 (1965).
89. 68 Misc. 2d 858, 328 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Civ. Ct. 1972).
90. UCC § 2-314, Comment 3; see also Comment, supra note 36, at 349 n.26; cf Fear
Ranches, Inc. v. Berry, 470 F.2d 905, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 27 (10th Cir. 1972) reported after
this article was written in which the court narrowly interpreted the "goods of the kind"
portion of the 2-401(1) merchant definition.
91. General Electric Credit Corp. v. R.A. Heintz Constr. Co., 302 F. Supp. 958 (D. Ore.
1969) (construction equipment, trucks); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Associates Discount
Corp., 246 Ark. 118, 436 S.W.2d 809 (1969) (auto); Security Pacific Nat'l Bank v. Goodman,
24 Cal. App. 3d 131, 100 Cal. Rptr. 763 (1972) (boats); English v. Ford, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1038,
95 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1971) (auto); Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 4 Cal. App. 3d 750, 84
Cal. Rptr. 654 (1970), aff'd, 3 Cal. 3d 544, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1, 476 P.2d 401 (1970), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 823 (1972) (airplanes); Harmony Homes, Inc. v. Zeit,__ Fla. Supp. -, 260 So.
2d 218 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (auto); Correria v. Orlando Bank and Trust Co., - Fla. Supp.
-, 235 So. 2d 20 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (auto); Christopher v. McGehee, 124 Ga. App. 310,
183 S.E.2d 624 (1971), aff'd, 228 Ga. 466, 186 S.E.2d 97 (1971) (used car); Charles S. Martin
Distrib. Co. v. Banks, 111 Ga. App. 538, 142 S.E.2d 309 (1965) (furniture & appliances);
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wholesalers"2 who obviously deal in goods of that kind. One case
interpreting 9-307(1) (protection of buyers of goods) in a similar
situation defined "merchant" as "one who engages in an economic
enterprise on a systematic basis, not merely an isolated transac-
tion ."3
The major problem of interpretation concerning the entrusting
section quoted above is determining whether the entrusting party
must know or have reason to know that he is entrusting to a dealer.
Professor Warren argues that the entruster need not know; his argu-
ment is that a factual inquiry into the entruster's knowledge frus-
trates the Code policy which rejects the doctrine of caveat emptor
in favor of a more unfettered negotiability of goods.94 He admits,
however, that others take the opposing view-that both the entrus-
ter and the purchaser must know that the seller is a dealer in goods
of the kind. 5 The opposing view is based on the premise that the
entruster should only lose if he is estopped by his entrustment to a
person whom he knows to be a merchant. Although Professor War-
ren urges that this is the very theory rejected by the drafters,9" one
case has held that it is still the rule under the Code. 7 That court
Humphrey Cadillac & Oldsmobile Co. v. Sinard, 85 Ill. App. 2d 64, 229 N.E.2d 365 (1967)
(auto); Litchfield v. Dueitt, 245 So. 2d 190 (Miss. 1971) (crane); Godfrey v. Gildsdorf, 86 Nev.
714, 476 P.2d 3 (1970) (auto); Palmer v. Booth & Cowley, Ltd., 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 182 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. 1970) (auto); Cosgriff v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 58 Misc. 2d 884, 296
N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (auto); Makransky v. Long Island Reo Truck Co., 58 Misc. 338,
295 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (truck); Sherman v. Roger Kresge, Inc., 67 Misc. 2d 178,
323 N.Y.S.2d 804 (County Ct. 1971) (auto); Medico Leasing Co. v. Smith, 457 P.2d 548 (Okla.
1969) (auto); Linwood Harvestore, Inc. v. Cannon, 427 Pa. 434, 235 A.2d 377 (1967) (silos);
Sterling Acceptance Co. v. Grimes, 194 Pa. Super. 503, 168 A.2d 600 (1961) (auto); Weisel v.
McBride, 191 Pa. Super. 411, 156 A.2d 613 (1959) (auto); Gricar v. Bairhalter, 11 Pa. D. &
C.2d 723 (1957) (auto); Williams v. Western Surety Co., 6 Wash. App. 300, 492 P.2d 596
(1972) (mobile homes), Couch v. Cockroft, 490 S.W. 2d 713 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972, cert.
denied, Tenn. S. Ct. 1973).
92. Independent News Co. v. Williams, 293 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1961) (comic book whole-
saler).
93. Newton-Waltham Bank & Trust Co. v. Bergen Motors, Inc., 68 Misc. 2d 228, 327
N.Y.S.2d 77 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
94. Warren, Cutting Off Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
30 U. Cm. L. REv. 469 (1963).
One author has gone so far as to suggest that the main purpose of all the merchant
provisions was to reverse the doctrine of caveat emptor. Vanmeveren, The Uniform Commer-
cial Code-Sales-Special Treatment for Merchants, 7 AM. Bus. L.J. 219 (1970). Although
2-403(2) and 2-312(3) certainly affect the doctrine, his assertion appears too broad.
95. Warren, supra note 94, at 473-74.
96. Id. at 476-78.
97. Atlas Auto Rental Corp. v. Weisberg, 54 Misc. 2d 168, 281 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Civ. Ct.
1967) (used car dealer); cf. Linwood Harvestore, Inc. v. Cannon, 427 Pa. 434, 235 A.2d 377
(1967) (silos).
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ruled that the purchaser had to prove that the entruster knew he
was entrusting his automobile to a wholesale auto dealer before the
entruster's rights would be cut off under 2-403(2).°s
2. "Who by his Occupation Holds Himself Out"99
Probably one of the least discussed and most important por-
tions of the merchant definition is the above captioned phrase. Two
early critics of the merchant definition stressed the possibility that
hobbyists such as gun collectors '1 ° or amateur sailors'' might be
merchants because they have knowledge or skill peculiar to goods.
If occupation, which is not defined in the Code, is used in its com-
mercial sense,'02 hobbyists would seem to be excluded.
The "holds himself out" language seems designed to include in
the merchant category a person who represents to others that he has
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the
transaction. Holding such a person to the special standards set for
merchants is analogous to negligence rules which establish higher
standards of care for a person holding himself out as an expert in a
given field.'0 3 At least two authorities have acknowledged that the
merchant status under this portion of the definition depends upon
a representation. 4 Both have further opined that, since representa-
tion is the key element, it is unnecessary that a person included in
the merchant definition actually have the requisite knowledge and
skill.'05 It would seem that the reverse proposition may also be true,
i.e., if a person does not by his occupation hold himself out as having
the requisite knowledge or skill, he should not be a merchant under
this portion of the definition even if he actually has such knowledge
or skill.
There has been much discussion of whether a lawyer familiar
with commercial practices is a merchant under this portion of the
98. Atlas Auto Rental Corp. v. Weisberg, 54 Misc. 2d 168, 281 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Civ. Ct.
1967) (used car dealer).
99. UCC § 2-104(1).
100. Note, supra note 7, at 131.
101. Waite, supra note 18, at 618 n.20.
102. "Occupation" has been defined as "the principal business of one's life: a craft,
trade, profession or other means of earning a living: EMPLOYMENT, VOCATION .... " WEaSTER'S
THmRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1560 (1966).
103. See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 161-66 (4th ed. 1971).
104. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 47, § 2-104:4, at 220; Comment, supra note 36, at 347.
105. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 47, § 2-104:4, at 220; Comment, supra note 36, at 347.
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definition. 0° An argument for excluding him is that a lawyer may
or may not be expert in commercial practices depending, for exam-
ple, on whether he specializes in commercial law or personal injury
law. A person holding himself out as a lawyer, therefore, should not
be deemed to represent that he is familiar with commercial prac-
tices unless he further holds himself out as a commercial lawyer. A
lawyer who buys or sells goods (e.g., office furniture)' 7 ordinarily
would not, and perhaps ethically should not, hold himself out as a
specialist in commercial law. Even if such a lawyer knew the prac-
tices he should not be deemed to be a merchant unless his special
knowledge is represented to the other party.
Presumably, the drafters would reject this argument as doing
violence to the spirit of the merchant rules and proper techniques
of interpretation. 08 Nonetheless, support for the argument can be
found in some language of the Code.
3. "Knowledge or Skill"''0
Does the word "skill," which is not defined in the Code, add
anything to the merchant definition? Both the dictionary"' and the
thesaurus"' equate skill with knowledge. Perhaps a person with
knowledge may not always have skill, but a person who has skill
must surely have knowledge. " Including skill in the definition does
no particular harm,"' although it is doubtful that any person is
covered who would not otherwise be covered under the knowledge
portion of the definition.
4. "Practices" ' 4
A major feature of 2-104(1) and its comments is the distinction
drawn between practices and goods by reason of the "practices"
language. The comments suggest that in certain situations lawyers,
106. BENDER § 1.02, at 1-11.
107. Id.
108. See S. MENTSCHIKOFF, supra note 24, at 6.
109. UCC § 2-104(1).
110. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2133 (1966).
111. P. ROGET, ROGET'S INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS 731.7 (3d ed. 1962).
112. "Skill" has been defined as "the ability to use one's knowledge effectively and
readily in execution or performance." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2133
(1966).
113. It is common to think of some types of expertise in terms of knowledge (e.g., a
lawyer's knowledge of the law), while other types of expertise are thought of in terms of skill
(e.g., a carpenter's skill with a hammer).
114. UCC § 2-104(1).
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purchasing agents and bank presidents, among others, may be mer-
chants."' As already noted, there are problems in defining "occupa-
tion" and "holds himself out" and in distinguishing "skill" from
"knowledge." The problems do not stop there. Nowhere in the Code
are "practices" defined. The comments indicate that the section
refers to "normal business practices" which are or ought to be famil-
iar to any person in business."' The lone example given is answering
mail,"'7 in apparent reference to 2-201(2) (Statute of Frauds between
merchants) and 2-207(2) (additional terms in acceptance). The
comments probably fairly represent the intent of the drafters, i.e.,
that the merchant sections be liberally construed."8 Unless one
equates "practices" with general business knowledge, as the com-
ments suggest, the number of persons added to the merchant cate-
gory by the inclusion of the word "practices" may not be signifi-
cant"-a person with knowledge of the special practices involved
in a transaction would in most cases also have knowledge of the
goods.
It is difficult, however, to construe "practices . . .involved in
the transaction"'20 as meaning general business knowledge; the lan-
guage seems to direct the lawyer to the particular practice or prac-
tices involved in the transaction. Under 2-205 (offer and accept-
ance), for example, a merchant's firm offer is not revocable for lack
of consideration provided the other requirements of the section are
satisfied.'2' The practice involved in the transaction would seem to
be that most firm commercial offers are recognized as binding. 22
Thus, if a person by his occupation holds himself out as one who
ought to know that such offers are binding, he would be a merchant;
otherwise, not.
115. Id. § 2-104, Comment 2.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See S. MENTSCHIKOFF, supra note 24, at 6.
119. See Professor Kripke's remarks in Hearing, supra note 4, at 183.
120. UCC § 2-104(1).
121. UCC § 2-205 provides:
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its terms
gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of consideration,
during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no event
may such period of irrevocability exceed three months; but any such term of assur-
ance on a form supplied by the offeree must be separately signed by the offeror.
122. See Keyes, Causes and Consideration in California-A Re-Appraisal, 47 CAUF. L.
REv. 74, 83 (1959).
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5. "May be Attributed by his Employment"'2 3
The merchant definition also establishes an agency rule which
deems a person a merchant when the requisite knowledge or skill as
to goods or practices involved may be imputed to him by his em-
ployment of someone having such skill or knowledge. For example,
if one employs a merchant to handle a transaction, the employee's
merchant status may be attributed to the principal. While it is
possible to hypothesize certain problems arising from this rule, 24
none have appeared in the cases. Although the word "attributed"
is not defined in the Code, it apparently means that a person's
merchant status is caused by his employment of a merchant. 2 5
Agency principles have dealt with the problem of imputing knowl-
edge of specific facts to a principal by reason of his agent's knowl-
edge; 26 the part of the merchant definition captioned above seems
to extend those principles to a more generalized knowledge concern-
ing practices or goods. For our purposes, it should be sufficient to
note two points: first, that a person not otherwise a merchant will
not often employ a merchant,' 27 and second, that questions relating
to the nature and sufficiency of knowledge or skill peculiar to goods
or practices should be the same whether we are considering princi-
pals or their agents.
6. "Chargeable with the Knowledge or Skill of Merchants' '2 28
It is questionable whether there is or ever was any need to
create a separate definition for "between merchants" once "mer-
chant" had been defined. It seems only reasonable to conclude that
in a transaction between merchants both parties must be mer-
chants. The Code drafters, however, not only felt the need to state
the obvious but were further compelled to state it in an innovative
manner; thus, they stated that both parties must be "chargeable
with the knowledge or skill of merchants."' 29 As one commentator
noted with respect to this drafting technique, "The problem posed
123. UCC § 2-104(1).
124. BENDER § 1.02, at 1-10, 1-11.
125. "Attributed" has been defined as "to explain as caused or brought about by
." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 142 (1966).
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 272-82 (1957).
127. In my research, I have found no case applying the principal-agent portion of 2-
104(1). See UCC § 2-104, Comment 2, referring to a university employing a purchasing agent
as an example of this rule.
128. UCC § 2-104(3).
129. Id.
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for the lawyer by any variation of word usage is that he must at least
pause to consider whether variation has produced significance.' 30
In this instance it appears that no significance was intended.
There is no indication in either the Code or the comments that
anything special was intended; further, research has failed to dis-
close any significance in the "chargeable" language. The additional
phrase appears to be a reference back to the several parts of the 2-
104(1) definition relating to skill or knowledge; no additional party
not already a merchant under that definition is designated by the
phrase.
Mercantile Capacity
In Comment 2 to section 2-104, the drafters suggest that a
person is a merchant only if he is acting in his mercantile capacity.
While a degree of circuity is involved in this proposition, the appar-
ent intent was to distinguish between business and non-business
efforts.' 3 1' If followed, the "mercantile capacity" comment would
minimize the significance of classifying a person (such as a purchas-
ing agent) as a merchant. If he is a merchant only when acting as a
purchasing agent, his merchant classification will be important
solely when he is employed by a non-merchant, i.e., if he is em-
ployed by a merchant to conduct the transaction, the application
of the merchant section would be governed by his employer's mer-
chant status.
Summary of Part III
In Part II of this article, 13 definitions suggested by the Code
were described. Such multiplicity of definition is unnecessary. First,
it appears that there is no significance in the slight variations in
language among the "goods of the kind" sections.' 31 If a person is a
merchant in one of these sections and not in another it is because
of the nature and purpose of the section and the circumstances of a
particular situation,' 3 not because of minor word variations. Sec-
ond, neither the use of "skill" in addition to "knowledge" in 2-
104(1) nor the definition of merchants as "parties . . . chargeable
with the knowledge or skill of merchants" in 2-104(3) adds any
130. Mellinkoff, supra note 1, at 207.
131. UCC § 2-104, Comment 2; see Note, Contract Draftsmanship Under Article Two
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 112 U. PA. L. Rav. 564, 576-77 (1964).
132. I.e., Sections 2-104(1), 2-312(3), 2-314(1) and 2-403(2).
133. See Part IV, infra.
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persons who would not otherwise be included in the merchant cate-
gory. Third, few persons would be added to the merchant category
by the agency rule of 2-104(1) because in most cases the principal
would himself be a merchant. Fourth, the number of persons in the
merchant category could be reduced by interpreting "occupation"
to mean gainful employment, "holding out" to mean representation
and "practices" to mean specific practices rather than general busi-
ness knowledge-not many persons who are not dealers in goods of
the kind and thus already merchants could be held to have repre-
sented to others by the nature of their work that they have knowl-
edge peculiar to the specific practices of a particular transaction.
Finally, if a person is only a merchant while in his mercantile capac-
ity, all noncommercial sales or purchases of goods would be ex-
cluded.
What remains, then, are (1) dealers in goods of the kind, (2)
certain persons who hold themselves out as having knowledge pecu-
liar to the goods' 3' and (3) other persons who hold themselves out
as having knowledge peculiar to the practices involved in the trans-
action. 3 - As suggested above, the latter two groups may be signifi-
cantly reduced if restrictive meanings are given to the various words
and phrases found in 2-104(1) which the Code left undefined.
IV. WHO IS A MERCHANT WITHIN THE CODE SECTIONS
ESTABLISHING SPECIAL RULES FOR MERCHANTS?
Several Code sections use the term "merchant" without further
indicating the class of persons meant to be included thereby. 13 In
such a situation, courts must necessarily construe the scope of the
term; most courts thus far have only been concerned with "dealers
in goods of the kind."'37 Whether such dealers will always be mer-
134. E.g., repairmen or truck drivers.
135. E.g., dealers in goods not of the kind, purchasing agents or bank officials; see
Couch v. Cockroft, 490 S.W.2d 713 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972, cert. denied, Tenn. S. Ct. 1973)
reported after this article was written in which the court found that the sale of an automobile
by a used car dealer to the defendant who had ten years' experience as an auto dealer was
not a transaction "between merchants" where defendant's experience had ended fifteen years
prior to the trial date and before the adoption of the UCC in Tennessee.
136. UCC §§ 2-103(1)(b), 2-201(2), 2-205, 2-207(2), 2-509(3), 2-603, 2-605.
137. Cases concerning 2-103(1)(b) are Massachusetts Gas & Elec. Light Supply Corp.
v. V-M Corp., 387 F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1967) (phonographs); National Car Rental v. Fox, 11
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 320 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (autos); Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp.,
290 A.2d 648 (Del. 1972) (autos); Swift v. J.I. Case Co., __ Fla. Supp. __, 11 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 190 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (tractors); Columbus Milk Producers' Cooperative v. Dept.
of Agriculture, 48 Wis. 2d 451, 180 N.W.2d 617 (1970) (milk producer, milk cooperative).
Cases applying 2-201(2) are Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc., 404
F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968) (construction company, equipment supplier); Associated Hardware
Supply Co. v. The Big Wheel Distr. Co., 355 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1965) (housewares wholesaler,
housewares retailer); Southwest Engineering Co. v. Martin Tractor Co., 205 Kan. 684, 473
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chants and whether other persons will ever be merchants depends
not only upon the matters discussed in Part III, but also upon the
way the various sections establishing special rules for merchants are
interpreted. Three problems must be considered:
(1) Are dealers in goods of the kind always merchants in each
section which establishes a special rule for a merchant? If not, when
and why not?
(2) Are other persons who may come within the general 2-104
definition of a merchant (e.g., a dealer in goods not of the kind, a
purchasing agent, a commercial lawyer,'38 a truck driver or a bank
official) always merchants in each section which establishes a spe-
cial rule for merchants if the application of the particular section is
not limited to "dealers in goods of the kind"?'39 If not, when and why
not?
P.2d 18 (1970) (construction company, equipment supplier); American Parts Co. v. American
Arbitration Ass'n, 8 Mich. App. 156, 154 N.W.2d 5 (1967) (fabric supplier, seat cover manu-
facturer); Campanelli v. Conservas Altamira, S.A., 86 Nev. 838, 477 P.2d 870 (1970) (food
wholesaler, food distributor); Azevedo v. Minister, 86 Nev. 576, 471 P.2d 661 (1970) (hay
ranchers); Reissman Int'l Corp. v. J.S.O. Wood Products, Inc., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1165
(Civ. Ct. 1972) (cabinet wholesaler, cabinet retailer); Trafalgar Square Ltd. v. Reeves Bros.,
Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d 194, 315 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (textile dealers); Reich v. Helen
Harper, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1049 (Civ. Ct. 1966) (fabric seller, fabric mill); John H.
Wickersham Eng'r & Constr., Inc. v. Arbutus Steel Co., 58 Lanc. L. Rev. 164, 1 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv, 49 (C.P. Pa. 1962) (construction company, steel supplier); Harry Rubin & Sons, Inc. v.
Consolidated Pipe Co. of America, 396 Pa. 506, 153 A.2d 472 (1959) (plastic pipe supplier,
Hula Hoop manufacturer); Hurricane Steel Industries Co. v. Maurice Pincoffs Co., 464
S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (supplier of metal rods, manufacturer of chain link fence).
A case applying the merchant language of 2-205 is E.A. Coronis Associates v. M. Gordon
Constr. Co., 90 N.J. Super. 69, 216 A.2d 246 (1966) (steel supplier, construction company).
Cases applying 2-207 are Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972)
(carpet manufacturer, carpet dealer); Southeastern Enameling Corp. v. General Bronze
Corp., 434 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1970) (bronze panel dealer, construction company); Roto-Lith,
Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962) (glue manufacturer, plastic bag
manufacturer); Th. Van Huijstee, N.V. v. Faehndrich, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 598 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y. 1972) (egg exporter, egg importer).
Cases applying 2-509 are Ellis v. Bell Aerospace Corp., 315 F. Supp. 221 (D. Ore. 1970)
(helicopter retailer); Mercanti v. Persson, 160 Conn. 468, 280 A.2d 137 (1971) (boat builder);
Hayward v. Postma, 31 Mich. App. 720, 188 N.W.2d 31 (1971) (boat retailer).
Cases applying 2-603 are Traynor v. Walters, 342 F. Supp. 455 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (Christ-
mas tree wholesaler); Mitchell Rubber Products, Inc. v. Hub Auto Supply, Inc., 28 Mass.
App. Dec. 109, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 837 (Mun. Ct. 1964) (auto supply dealer).
A case applying 2-605 is SCA International, Inc. v. Garfield & Rosen, Inc., 337 F. Supp.
246 (D. Mass. 1971) (shoe wholesaler).
138. See note 106 supra and accompanying text for an argument against classifying a
lawyer as a merchant.
139. Sections 2-312(3), 2-314(1) and 2-403(2) specify that they are limited to merchants
in goods of the kind.
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(3) May any person who does not come within the 2-104 defini-
tion of a merchant ever be a merchant in any section which estab-
lishes a special rule for a merchant? If so, when and why?
To answer these questions it is necessary to consider the roles,
if any, played by the nature or purpose of the different merchant
rules and the circumstances of the particular situation. Two ex-
treme positions can be taken which make the answers to the above
questions much simpler. If one takes the position (hereinafter re-
ferred to as Approach #1) that definitions should be applied consis-
tently to achieve certainty,'40 he may assert that neither the nature
or the purpose of a particular section nor the underlying circumstan-
ces should affect the definition. The answers to the above questions
under this approach would be (1) that dealers in goods of the kind
would always be merchants; (2) other persons within the 2-104(1)
definition would be merchants except in Sections 2-312(3), 2-314(1)
and 2-403(2) (which are explicitly limited to merchants in goods of
the kind) and (3) no other person could ever be a merchant or have
a merchant rule applied to him. At the other extreme is the position
(hereinafter referred to as Approach #2), apparently taken by the
drafters,' 4 ' that the nature and purpose of the rule together with the
underlying circumstances should determine whether a merchant
rule should be applicable. If the nature and purpose of a rule or the
underlying circumstances indicate that a particular person should
or should not be subject to that rule, this approach would include
or exclude him from the section based upon those factors-not upon
the definition.
Between the two extremes are two other positions which would
rely on the nature and purpose of the rule and the underlying cir-
cumstances to refine the merchant definition. Under either of these
approaches, a person, to be subject to a merchant rule, would have
to fit the 2-104(1) definition. The first of these approaches (herein-
after referred to as Approach #3) is suggested by Comment 2 of 2-
104, which provides:
The professional status under the definition may be based
140. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
141. S. MENTSCHIKOFF, supra note 24, at 6. It should be noted that the Code and
comments specifically provided that merchant sections could be applied to persons who did
not come within the strict definition of a merchant. The Code provision and the comments
were deleted over the strong objection of the drafters. See Professor Kripke's remarks in
Hearing, supra note 4, at 181-82.
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upon specialized knowledge as to the goods, specialized
knowledge as to business practices, or specialized knowl-
edge as to both and which kind of specialized knowledge
may be sufficient to establish the merchant status is indi-
cated by the nature of the provisions.
Under this approach, the nature or purpose of a section would
be used solely to determine which type of specialized knowledge is
required to make a person a merchant within that section; any
person who had the requisite knowledge would then be a merchant
within that section. This approach thus assumes agreement with
the apparent intent of the drafters of the comment quoted above
that "business practices" means general business knowledge.'42
The final position (hereinafter referred to as Approach #4) takes
Approach #3 one step further. Having determined that X fits the
merchant definition of 2-104(1), that the section being interpreted
is one in which, for example, specialized knowledge of general busi-
ness practices is required, and that X has the requisite specialized
knowledge, a final question is asked: Is there any reason why X
should be excluded from the merchant category when the underly-
ing circumstances of the situation are considered?
Each of the last three approaches suggested refers to the nature
or purpose of the merchant sections and to the underlying circum-
stances. To complete the analysis, therefore, a limited examination
of those particular sections must be attempted. This task is compli-
cated by the fact that, while the general purpose of a section may
be reasonably clear, the specific reason for limiting application to
merchants is often not nearly as clear. 4 3 That warning noted, we will
proceed.
The drafters of the Code have attempted to designate those
sections which require each type of specialized knowledge by estab-
lishing three groups of sections which mention merchants.' These
three groups are discussed below.
142. See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
143. See Hall, Article 2-Sales- "From Status to Contract"?, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 209.
Perhaps the major reason for this difficulty is that the drafters and others expected a liberal
interpretation of the merchant provisions that would include nonmerchants in most cases.
See Report on Article 2, supra note 19, at 154.
144. UCC § 2-104, Comment 2 provides:
The term "merchant" as defined here roots in the "law merchant" concept of a
professional in business. The professional status under the definition may be based
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Group I sections rest on normal business practices which are or
ought to be typical of and familiar to any person in business. For
purposes of these sections almost every businessman would, there-
fore, be deemed to be a merchant, since the practices involved in
the transaction are nonspecialized business practices such as an-
swering mail. Sections 2-201(2) (Statute of Frauds between mer-
chants), 2-205 (firm offers), 2-207(2) (additional terms in accept-
ance between merchants) and 2-209(2) (special rule for exclusion of
modification between merchants) are in this group.
Group II sections require a professional status as to particular
kinds of goods and is a much smaller group than everyone who is
engaged in business. Sections 2-314(1) (warranty of merchantabil-
ity), 2-402(2) (special rule for merchants who retain goods sold) and
2-403(2) (entrusting to a merchant of goods of the kind) are in this
group.
Group III sections apply to persons who are merchants under
upon specialized knowledge as to the goods, specialized knowledge as to business
practices, or specialized knowledge as to both and which kind of specialized knowl-
edge may be sufficient to establish the merchant status is indicated by the nature of
the provisions.
The special provisions as to merchants appear only in this Article and they are
of three kinds. Sections 2-201(2), 2-205, 2-207 and 2-209 dealing with the statute of
frauds, firm offers, confirmatory memoranda and modification rest on normal busi-
ness practices which are or ought to be typical of and familiar to any person in
business. For purposes of these sections almost every person in business would, there-
fore, be deemed to be a "merchant" under the language "who... by his occupation
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices. . . involved
in the transaction . . " since the practices involved in the transaction are non-
specialized business practices such as answering mail. In this type of provision, banks
or even universities, for example, well may be "merchants." But even these sections
only apply to a merchant in his mercantile capacity; a lawyer or bank president
buying fishing tackle for his own use is not a merchant.
On the other hand, in Section 2-314 on the warranty of merchantability, such
warranty is implied only "if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that
kind." Obviously this qualification restricts the implied warranty to a much smaller
group than everyone who is engaged in business and requires a professional status as
to particular kinds of goods. The exception in Section 2-402(2) for retention of posses-
sion by a merchant-seller falls in the same class; as does Section 2-403(2) on entrust-
ing of possession to a merchant "who deals in goods of that kind."
A third group of sections includes 2-103(1)(b), which provides that in the case
of a merchant "good faith" includes observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing in the trade; 2-327(1)(c), 2-603 and 2-605, dealing with responsibilities
of merchant buyers to follow seller's instruction, etc.; 2-509 on risk of loss, and 2-609
on adequate assurance of performance. This group of sections applies to persons who
are merchants under either the "practices" or the "goods" aspect of the definition of
merchant.
Id. (emphasis added).
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either the "practices" or the "goods" aspect of the definition of
merchant. Sections 2-103(1)(b) (definition of good faith in the case
of a merchant), 2-327(1)(c) (special rule for merchant buyer under
a sale on approval), 2-509(3) (special rule for merchant's risk of
loss), 2-603 (merchant buyer's duties as to goods rightfully rejected),
2-605(1)(b) (special rule between merchants for waiver of buyer's
objections after rejecting goods) and 2-609(2) (assurances of per-
formance between merchants) are in this group.
The author believes that a somewhat better classification could
be achieved by transposing Sections 2-327(1)(c), 2-509(3) and 2-603
from Group III to Group II, by adding 2-312(3) (merchant seller's
warranty against infringement) to Group II, and by suggesting that
Group II includes persons who represent that they have specialized
knowledge in both goods and practices.'45 Under this revised
scheme, then, Group III would contain only Sections 2-103(1)(b), 2-
605(1)(b) and 2-609(2). The individual sections will be discussed
under this proposed structure. 4 '
Group I: Normal Business Practices
Section 2-201(2) (Statute of Frauds between merchants) 4 ' was
primarily designed to handle the problem of one party to a transac-
tion being bound while the other was free to play the market.'48 If
Party A sent a signed written confirmation of an oral agreement to
Party B, A was bound but B could rely on the common law Statute
of Frauds to escape liability. Section 2-201(2) changes that result in
a transaction between merchants.
Section 2-205149 was designed to codify the common commercial
145. Consequently, if my restructuring is correct, those persons who are not dealers in
goods of the kind but by their occupation hold themselves out as having knowledge peculiar
to the goods involved in the transaction (e.g., auto mechanics or truck drivers) would only
be merchants within the either "goods" or "practices" sections listed in Group I.
146. It will be apparent to the reader that the classification of a particular section
within a specific category can be disputed. My reasons for the proposed classifications will
be suggested as the sections are discussed in the hope that anyone relying upon or disputing
the classification will at least know the basis for it.
147. UCC § 2-201(2) provides:
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the
contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has
reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against
such party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within ten days
after it is received.
148. BENDER § 2.04[2], at 2-43.
149. UCC § 2-205 provides:
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practice of treating a firm offer as binding.5 0 The section is limited
to a merchant because he is presumed to know the common com-
mercial practice and is required to act accordingly.' 5'
Section 2-207 s2 concerns the "battle of the forms" problem' 3
and was designed to align the law with the normal commercial
understanding of the parties.' s4 Thus, where the parties think they
have an agreement, the Code agrees. The apparent reason for distin-
guishing between merchants and others in subsection (2) was the
belief that persons who do not transact business regularly should not
be expected to make unnegotiated adjustments because of last min-
ute changes by those with whom they deal.'
Section 2-209' s1 revised a standard rule of contract law that
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its terms
gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of consideration,
during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no event
may such period of irrevocability exceed three months; but any such term of assur-
ance on a form supplied by the offeree must be separately signed by the offeror.
150. Keyes, supra note 122.
151. Attempted reliance on this section was rejected in Wilmington Trust Co. v. Coul-
ter, 41 Del. Ch. 548, 200 A.2d 441 (1964), in which a corporate trustee argued that the trust
company was bound by a firm offer to sell stock on behalf of the trust. The court's dictum
that the trustee was not a merchant is very questionable, though the case seems decided
correctly on other grounds.
152. UCC § 2-207 provides:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation
which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it
states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless
acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different
terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not
otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract
consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any
supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.
153. See the excellent discussion of the business background of "the battle of the forms"
in L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CoNTRACT LAw 530-32 (1972).
154. UCC § 2-207, Comment 2.
155. See Note, The Uniform Commercial Code: Some Selected Problems, 105 U. PA.
L. REv. 837, 861 (1957).
156. UCC §§ 2-209(1) and (2) provide:
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration
to be binding.
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modifications or rescissions must be supported by consideration.
The revision of the common law rule could result in constant allega-
tions of oral modifications. To allow a party to protect himself in
advance against such allegations, the section permits the parties to
create their own Statute of Frauds by agreeing that a modification
or rescission must be in writing.'57 Where such requirement appears
on a merchant's form, the requirement must be signed separately
by a nonmerchant. Between merchants there need be no separate
signing on the apparent assumption that merchants are able to
understand forms and should be more careful to read them.
The effect of the last three approaches'58 upon determining
whether an individual qualifies as a merchant under the Group I
(normal business practices) sections is presented below. Section 2-
205 (firm offers) is used as an example of the methodology which
would be applied by the three approaches to Group I sections.
Under Approach #2 any person who was or should have been
aware of the common commercial practice (that firm offers are
binding without consideration) would be bound by his action (mak-
ing a firm offer) regardless of whether he fit the merchant definition.
Under Approach #3 one would examine the appropriate section
(2-205) and see whether it requires general business knowledge-in
this case, the section concerns business and legal problems of con-
tract formation and has nothing to do with goods. Thus, it is a
section requiring general business knowledge; any person who fits
the merchant definition because he holds himself out as having such
general business knowledge would be bound by a firm offer.
Under Approach #4 the person bound under Approach #3 might
escape liability if he could show that in his line of business there was
no common commercial practice that firm offers are binding with-
out consideration, or perhaps even if there were, that he was una-
ware of it.'59
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification except by a signed writing
cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as between merchants such a
requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be separately signed by the
other party.
157. See Note, Contract Draftsmanship Under Article Two of The Uniform Commercial
Code, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 564, 576-77 (1964).
158. Approach #1 does not rely on the nature or purposes of the section. Thus if a person
fits the 2-104(1) definition, he is a merchant; otherwise, not.
159. The factors which will excuse a person from liability under Approach #4 depend
greatly on the stress placed upon and the interpretation given to the "holds himself out"
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Group II: Goods and Practices
Under this heading we start with the three sections classified
as "goods" sections (i.e., sections which require a professional status
as to particular kinds of goods) by the drafters-viz., 2-314(1) (war-
ranty of merchantability), 2-402(2) (special rule for merchants who
retain goods sold) and 2-403(2) (entrusting to a merchant of goods
of the kind). The author has added Sections 2-312(3) (merchant
seller's warranty against infringement), 2-509(3) (special rule for
merchant's risk of loss), 2-603 (merchant buyer's duties as to goods
rightfully rejected) and 2-327(1)(c) (special rule for merchant buyer
under a sale on approval) to the list of sections under Group II. The
"and practices" language in the caption is included because in some
sections 60 the merchant is a dealer who of necessity holds himself
out as having knowledge of business practices, while in other sec-
tions'6 ' the merchant should hold himself out as having knowledge
of both goods and practices before he is held to a higher standard.
The respective sections which comprise revised Group II are dis-
cussed briefly below.6 2
Section 2-402(2) 163 adopts the doctrine of ostensible ownership,
which has been described as follows:
The protection of the seller's creditors against the
buyer is principally predicated on the doctrine of ostensible
ownership. Although the buyer may be said to own the
goods, his leaving them in the seller's possession has cre-
ated the deceptive impression that the seller owns them.
Thus, a second buyer of the sold goods, if in the ordinary
course, would prevail over the first buyer; a purchaser in
good faith might also prevail. The seller's creditors should
likewise be protected because they, too, can be misled by
the seller's retention of possession. In fact, the particular
language of 2-104(1); see notes 99-108 supra and accompanying text.
160. Viz., Sections 2-314(1), 2-402(2), 2-403(2), 2-312(3) and 2-509(3).
161. Viz., Sections 2-603 and 2-327(1)(c).
162. Sections 2-314(1) and 2-403(2) are discussed supra notes 71-98 and accompanying
text.
163. UCC § 2-402(2) provides:
A creditor of the seller may treat a sale or an identification of goods to a contract
for sale as void if as against him a retention of possession by the seller is fraudulent
under any rule of law of the state where the goods are situated, except that retention
of possession in good faith and current course of trade by a merchant-seller for a
commercially reasonable time after a sale or identification is not fraudulent.
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creditor may not have been misled but this may be deemed
unimportant.' 4
However, an exception to the doctrine has been adopted which
provides that retention in good faith and current course of trade by
a merchant seller for a commercially reasonable time is not fraudu-
lent. The apparent reason for this exception is the balancing of the
drafters' desire for more unfettered negotiability of goods' 5 with a
feeling that creditors of a nonmerchant are more likely to be misled
by his retention of the goods.' 6
Section 2-509(3)'1" is a risk of loss section. According to Com-
ment 3 to 2-509,
The underlying theory of this rule is that a merchant
who is to make physical delivery at his own place continues
meanwhile to control the goods and can be expected to
insure his interest in them. The buyer, on the other hand,
has no control of the goods and it is extremely unlikely that
he will carry insurance on goods not yet in his possession.
Section 2-603'11 is designed to place upon the merchant buyer
the additional duties of following reasonable instructions from his
seller after buyer's rejection; resale is also indicated in certain dis-
164. Gordon, The Prepaying Buyer: Second Class Citizenship Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code Article 2, 63 Nw. U. L. REv. 565, 576-77 (1968).
165. See Warren, Cutting Off Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 469 (1963).
166. For a discussion of 2-312(3), see notes 64-72 supra and accompanying text.
167. UCC § 2-509(3) provides: "In any case not within subsection (1) or (2), the risk of
loss passes to the buyer on his receipt of the goods if the seller is a merchant; otherwise the
risk passes to the buyer on tender of delivery."
168. UCC § 2-603 provides:
(1) Subject to any security interest in the buyer (subsection (3) of Section 2-711),
when the seller has no agent or place of business as the market of rejection a merchant
buyer is under a duty after rejection of goods in his possession or control to follow
any reasonable instructions received from the seller with respect to the goods and in
the absence of such instructions to make reasonable efforts to sell them for the seller's
account if they are perishable or threaten to decline in value speedily. Instructions
are not reasonable if on demand indemnity for expenses is not forthcoming.
(2) When the buyer sells goods under subsection (1), he is entitled to reim-
bursement from the seller or out of the proceeds for reasonable expenses of caring
for and selling them, and if the expenses include no selling commission then to such
commission as is usual in the trade or if there is'none to a reasonable sum not
exceeding ten per cent on the gross proceeds.
(3) In complying with this section the buyer is held only to good faith and good
faith conduct hereunder is neither acceptance nor conversion nor the basis of an
action for damages.
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tress situations. The merchant buyer is distinguished from the non-
merchant in the hope of effecting a balance between inconvenience
to the buyer and the possibility of disproportionate loss to the
seller.' 5 Section 2-327(1)(c)'7 ° also places an added burden on a
merchant buyer when he elects to return goods sold to him on ap-
proval. He, too, must follow any reasonable instructions received
from the seller. The reason for this rule would similarly seem to be
that the merchant understands the instructions, has the ability to
follow them and consequently will not be unduly burdened if he is
required to follow them.
An example of the effect of the last three approaches upon
determining whether a person is a merchant under Group II sections
(goods and practices) is offered below. Section 2-603 (merchant
buyer's duties upon rightful rejection) is the section chosen to pres-
ent the methodology of the three approaches.
Under Approach #2 any person who purchased goods and right-
fully rejected them would be held to the obligation of 2-603 if he
understood the instructions and had sufficient knowledge of the
goods and markets so as not to be unduly burdened by this task.
Under Approach #3 one would examine Section 2-603 and dis-
cover that it requires an understanding of both goods and practices.
Any person who holds himself out as having knowledge of the goods
involved and of general business practices would thus be obligated
under 2-603.
Under Approach #4 the person obligated under Approach #3
might escape liability if he could show that someone in his particu-
lar business could not be expected to shoulder this burden or per-
haps that he personally did not have adequate knowledge of the
markets in the goods or did not understand the instructions.
Group III: Goods or Practices-Reasonable Action
Included in this group are Sections 2-103(1)(b) (good faith in
the case of a merchant), 2-605(1)(b)(waiver of buyer's objection
after rejecting goods) and 2-609(2) (assurance of performance be-
tween merchants). This is probably a most arbitrary and disputable
169. Note, supra note 155, at 867.
170. UCC § 2-327(1)(c) provides: "Under a sale on approval unless otherwise agreed
(c) after due notification of election to return, the return is at the seller's risk and expense
but a merchant buyer must follow any reasonable instructions."
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classification.' However, three closely related reasons support a
determination that the greatest number of persons should qualify as
merchants within these sections:
(1) Each section seems to require only reasonable behavior and
thus the determination of merchant status is less important because
harsh results are avoided by adjustments in the standard of reasona-
ble behavior, e.g., a television repairman rejecting a television set
might act reasonably if his response to a request for specification of
defects (Section 2-605(1)(b)) was quite detailed as to the defects but
was presented in a very informal communication a few weeks after
the request; on the other hand, the response of a banker or purchas-
ing agent rejecting the same set might be expected to be more
prompt and formal but less detailed as to technical defects.
(2) The general good faith standard set out in Article 1 incorpo-
rates a subjective definition of good faith.7 ' As suggested below,
performance can best be measured objectively.' Since the Article
1 definition does not seem to permit objective determinations,
broad use of the Article 2 sections requiring objectively reasonable
behavior is desirable.
(3) The reasons for confining the application of these sections
to merchants are less apparent than is true for other sections.
Section 2-103(1)(b)"' establishes a standard of good faith for
merchants. It was apparently designed as a test of good faith per-
formance and can be distinguished from good faith purchase' as
follows:
In this sense "good faith" has nothing to do with a state of
171. For instance, Professor Kripke would apparently classify 2-605(1).(b) as a practices
section. Professor Kripke's remarks in Hearing, supra note 4, at 183.
172. UCC § 1-201(19).
173. See notes 174-77 infra and accompanying text.
174. UCC § 2-103(1)(b) provides: "In this Article unless the context requires otherwise
(b) 'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."
For a discussion of the conceptual problems involved in dealing with the Code's good
faith obligation, see Stankiewicz, Good Faith Obligation in the Uniform Commercial Code:
Some Problems in Determining Its Meaning and Evaluating Its Effect, 7 VAL. U.L. REv. 389
(1973).
175. The merchant good faith test has, however, been used in the good faith purchase
sense through the definition of a buyer in the ordinary course of business and the use of that
term in 2-403(2); see, e.g., National Car Rental v. Fox, 18 Ariz. App. 160, 500 P.2d 1148
(1972).
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mind-with innocence, suspicion, or notice. Here the in-
quiry goes to decency, fairness or reasonableness in per-
formance or enforcement.'
In order to test good faith performance it is necessary that an objec-
tive test be developed; as the same writer points out:
Good faith performance properly requires some objec-
tive standard tied to commercial reasonableness ....
* ' * Surely the test is not whether one party actually
believed that he was acting decently, fairly or reasonably.
Surely he must do more than form an honest judgment.'77
It has been noted that the merchant good faith test may be
limited in scope because it may only apply where good faith is
mentioned specifically in Article 2 and where there are commer-
cially reasonable standards of fair dealing in the trade.', However,
it seems clear that 2-103(1)(b) was not so intended and in fact would
have been used as a basis for the general test of good faith in Article
1 had bankers not intervened. 9
Section 2-609'1o is a specific application of the merchant good
faith principle established in 2-103(1)(b). A person judging (1)
whether he has reasonable grounds for insecurity or (2) the ade-
quacy of any assurance received should act reasonably.
Section 2-605'' requires the merchant buyer to state the defects
176. Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666, 668 (1963).
177. Id. at 671-72.
178. See Farnsworth, supra note 176; see also Summers, "Good Faith" In General
Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195
(1968).
179. See Farnsworth, supra note 176; see also Summers, "Good Faith" In General
Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195
(1968).
180. UCC § 2-609(2) provides: "Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds for
insecurity and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined according to com-
mercial standards."
181. UCC § 2-605(1)(b) provides:
(1) The buyer's failure to state in connection with rejection a particular defect
which is ascertainable by reasonable inspection precludes him from relying on the
unstated defect to justify rejection or to establish breach
(b) between merchants when the seller has after rejection made a request
in writing for a full and final written statement of all defects on which
the buyer proposes to rely.
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relied upon for rejection when the information is requested in writ-
ing by another merchant. Again it seems he is only asked to act
reasonably.
An example of the effect of the last three approaches upon
determining whether a person is a merchant under the sections in
the "Goods or Practices-Reasonable Action" classification (Group
III above) is offered below. Section 2-103(1)(b) (definition of good
faith in case of a merchant) is the section chosen to present the
methodology of the three applications.
Under Approach #2 any person could be expected to act accord-
ing to the reasonable standards of his business; accordingly, the
merchant good faith test of 2-103(1)(b) should be applied to him.
Under Approach #3 one would examine 2-103(1)(b) and dis-
cover that it does not really depend on a knowledge of either goods
or practices; thus, he would determine that any person who met the
merchant definition of 2-104(1) should be included. Thus, in this
case the result would be the same as would be indicated by Ap-
proach #1.112
Under Approach #4 the person obligated under Approaches #1
and #3 would still be bound on the assumption that all we are
seeking is action in accordance with reasonable standards of busi-
ness.
THE RESULT: UNCERTAINTY
The merchant sections are not the best drafted sections in the
Code. Among the many problems are: the minor variations in word-
ing from section to section, the words and phrases used in the defini-
tion which are not themselves defined, the comments which confuse
and in some cases suggest interpretations not supported by the
Code, the term "merchant," which has common sense, case law and
historical meanings different from each other and from the Code
definition, and the suggested reliance on the purposes of each mer-
chant section to aid in answering a merchant question without any
clear specification of those purposes.
It appears that the drafters of the Code asked too much of the
merchant concept. They sought the certainty of a central definition
and at the same time the fluidity of a merchant classification that
182. See note 140 supra and accompanying text.
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could expand or contract according to the needs of a particular
situation. In addition, they hoped in the merchant sections to codify
commercial practices, to correct specific abuses, to reform areas of
the law and to establish higher standards of conduct for profession-
als. However, certainty and fluidity do not blend well and the deter-
mination of a merchant question is complicated by the existence of
so many different purposes underlying the merchant sections.
There have not been very many difficult "merchant" cases.
Since most Code problems involve dealers in goods of the kind, that
result should be expected. Nonetheless, courts facing difficult mer-
chant questions are free to do whatever they wish. Good arguments
for the most liberal or strict interpretation can be found in the Code
and comments. The best approach to answering a merchant ques-
tion involves case-by-case examination of the nature and purposes
of the Code section involved and the facts of particular cases. It
might have been easier to justify such an approach if each of the
sections establishing a different rule had clearly described the types
of persons subject to the rule instead of referring to a central term
of uncertain meaning.
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